114

But

when
if

we believe ˇthat we must find that order, the ideal, in the actual language we easily

get to
reach the stage of

speaking of a [“| ‘]real[”| ’] sign, of searching

looking
ˇlooking

for the real sign, – behind [w|t]hat ˇwhich is ordinarily called ⌊“⌋the sign⌊”⌋. // behind that, namely, which is ordinar ordinarily called “the sign”. // ‒ ‒ For we now

feel the need
long

for something ˇmore purer. The

idea
meaning

(the

nature
essence

) of our

enquiry
study

ˇhere requires here something purer asks for purer objects, of which the strict rules treat are about. The totality of these rules – we imagine – is to constitutes the complete grammar of the

symbol
sign

. The proposition, the word, of which logic treats must be something pure and sharp-cut. We now rack our brains about the essence of the

symbol
sign

. – In fact, [M|m]ustn't Isn't it be the

image
idea

of the word;

or even,
,

the idea at the present moment?

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.