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But if || when we believe that we must find that order, the ideal, in the actual language we easily reach the stage of || get to speaking of a “ || ‘real” || ’ sign, of searching || looking || looking for the real sign, – behind what || that which is ordinarily called “the sign”. || behind that, namely, which is ordinarily called “the sign”. ‒ ‒ For we now long || feel the need for something purer || more pure. The meaning || idea (the essence || nature) of our study || enquiry requires here something purer || here requires || asks for purer objects, of which the strict rules treat || which the strict rules are about. The totality of these rules is to constitute || – we imagine – constitutes the complete grammar of the sign || symbol. The proposition, the word, of which logic treats must be something pure and sharp-cut. We now rack our brains about the essence of the sign || symbol. – In fact, mustn't || Mustn't it be || Isn't it the idea || image of the word; in fact, || or even, the idea at the present moment?

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.