109
On the one hand it is clear that every proposition of our language
“is in order just as it is”.
That is, that we don't
69
aren't trying to
reach
don't strive
after |
an ideal.
As though our ordinary, vague propositions didn't
ˇyet have
any meaning
yet and we had
to show what a
correct proposition looks like.
On the other hand it seems clear that where there is meaning there must
be perfect order.
perfect order must be even in the vaguest proposition.
“The meaning of
proposition – we
to say – can certainly leave this or that open,
but the proposition must
surely have
one definite
meaning.”
Or: “An
[“|‘]indefinite
meaning’
, that would really be
no
meaning.”
Th
[at|is]
is like saying
, :
“A boundary
is
_
n
[o|']t sharp,
that
is really no
boundary at all”.
Thech line of thought
here is
this:
[I|i]f I
say
, “I
've locked
up
in
in the room
– only
one door
open”, then in fact I haven't locked
him
at
all;
he only gives the there was only an
a illusion pretence of
ˇhis being
locked
.
ˇhere in such a case be inclined to say
here, :
“so
you didn't do
anything nothing's
has been
done at all”.
And yet
he did do something
ˇ was had
been done.
(A boundary
has
a
–
likech to say – is as good as none at all.
But is
th
[at|is]
really true?)
Consider also this proposition: “The
ru
[el|le]s of a game can certainly
a certain freedom, but
they must
be
quite definite rules.”
That
's
is as though you
, :
“By means of four walls you can
n indeed leave
a person a certain freedom of movement, but the walls must be perfectly
ri
dgid” – and
th
[at|is]
is
_
n
[o|']t true.
If,
however ˇon the other hand,
you say
, : “the
walls may
, , be elastic, but then they have
definite
elasticity” – what does
th
[at|is]
say
further? ?
It seems to say that you
be able to state this elasticity; but
th
[at|is]
again is not true.
“The thing
always has one definite length –
whether I know
or
not”:
th[at|is] is really
by this we really
70
really the avowal of
ˇa declar[a|e]ation that we
attach ourselves to a particular expression.
That
namely Th[at|e]
form of expression which
makes
use
s of makes use of the
form
of an
‘ideal of
exactness
’. –
[S|s]o to speak as a parameter of the description.