94
Suppose I explain: “By
‘Moses’ I
the man, if
such a
existed, who
led the Isrealites out of
Egypt
[,| ;] whatever
he may
have been
called then his name and whatever else
he may have done or not
not have
done”.
But
ˇregarding the same sort of
doubts is are possible
regarding the words of this explanation as
ˇare
possible there is about the name
“Moses” (what do you
call “Egypt”, whom do you call “the
Isrealites”,
etc.).
In fact, these questions
don't
wouldn't even come to an end
ˇeven
when if we
have
had
reached words like “red”, “dark”,
“
”.
–
“But how
an
explanation help me to
an
understand
ing,
then, , if
it
's isn't
never the
one?
ˇThat means
[T|t]he the explanation is never
finished,
then ˇcompleted; I still don't
understa
[d|n]d, and never will, what he means.”
As though an explanation
would
h
[a|u]ng,
as it were, in the air unless
there were another to
support it
another ˇone supported
it.
Whereas although [a|A]n
One explanation may rest on another
that one
has ˇexplanation which has been given,
none
ˇbut no explanation
is in need
s of another
, –
unless
we need it in order to avoid a misunderstanding.
We
say: an
explanation serves to remove a misunderstanding or to prevent
o
ne
, – –
one, that is,
ˇone which would arise
without that
if there
were not the |
explanation
[,| ;] but not
,
one
that I
imagine.
It
easily appear as
though every doubt
showed ˇ
a symptom of
gap in the
foundation
s,
so that a
understanding is only
62
only possible if we first doubt
everything that
can be doubted, and then remove all these
doubts.