86
Consider this example: If someone
says
, :
“Moses
exist”,
then
that can mean this can have different
sorts of
things meanings.
It may mean: the
[i|I]srealites
did
_
n
[o|']t have
one leader when they
Egypt – or: their leader was not called
Moses –
or
; : there
ˇnever was
nbody nobody that
anyone who did all
the
Bible records of
Moses – etc.,
etc..
–
According to In
Russell
's
ˇterminology we may say: the name
“Moses” can be defined by
various descriptions.
, as
“the man who as a child was taken from the Nile by the
daughter of
Pharoah
Pharao”,
etc..
And
according as we take the one or the other definition the
“Moses existed” gets a
different
, and
similarly
with every
which treats of
Moses. –
And if someone
us
, :
“N did
_
n
[o|']t exist”,
do we
ask
ˇ questions
like, :
“What do you mean? Do you wish to say that
…, or that …,
etc.
etc.?”
But if I make a statement about Moses, am I
always prepared to substitute any
one of these descriptions for
“Moses”?
I shall say
, perhaps
,:
that – by
“Moses” I
the man who did
what the
56
the
Bible records of
Moses, or at any rate
of it.
But how much?
Have I
come to any deci
[sion|ded]
as to how much
ˇof it must
to be false in order that I
should
my
as
falsech?
So Has ˇis my use of the name
“Moses”
for me them a
fixed and
clearly unambiguously determined
use in
for all possible cases?
–
Isn't it like this, that I have
, , a whole
of props in
re
adiness, and am prepared to lean on one if another
shou
[d|l]d be
withdrawn ˇtaken from
under me, and vice versa?
–
Consider
still yet another
case: If I say, “N has died”,
then the position
with as
regard
s to the meaning of
the name
“N” may be this: I believe that a
person lived whom
I (1) in such and such
a
place
[,|s,] who (2) looked like this
and
this (pictures), (3) did such and such
ˇthings,
and (4) in the social world
had the name
bears this
name |
“N”.
ˇIf
[A|a]sked what I
by
“N” I should enumerate all
th[at|is] these things, or
some of
itˇ them, and different
things
ones on different occasions.
My definition of “N” would
ˇthus be
, then say: “the man of whom all
th
[at|is]
is true”.
–
But suppose some
thing in
of it
should turns
turned out to be
false
, – –
should shall will I be
prepared to declare
the
“N has died” false,
– even
if ˇonly ˇthough something
which that ˇthat to me
seeme[d|s] to
me quite
inessential
incidental |
turn[e|s]d had
turned out to be false?
But where is the limit of what
's
is
? –
If I had Had I, in such a case, given an
explanation of the name
in such a case,
then I
now be prepared to
it.
And
we may express this
by saying:
ˇcan be expressed thus: I use the name
“N” without a
ˇrigid
meaning.
(But
th
[at|is]
no more impairs its use tha
[t|n] it impairs
impairs the use of a table that it
stand[s|ing] on four legs instead of
on three and so on occasion ˇthough
occasionally such a table
wobbles.)
Ought
to say that I use a
word
whose the meaning
ˇof
which
I don't know and
so talk
nonsense ˇthus what I say has no sense? –
Say what you like, so long as this
does
n't
not
prevent you from see
[k|i]ng what the situation is.
(And if you
57
you see
th
[at|is],
then there are
things you won't
say.)