And, if we take to extend this comparison, still a bit further, then it is clear that the degree to which the sharp can picture can be similar to resemble the indistinct one, depends on the degree of indistinctness

of
in

the latter. For suppose you had an indistinct picture and had to

draw
sketch

a [“| ‘]corresponding[”| ’] sharp picture. In the

first there
former

is an indistinct blurred red rectangle; you replace it by a sharp one. Of course – various such sha[p|r]p rectangles might be drawn which to co corresponded to the

blurred
indistinct

one. – But if in the original the colours

merge
run

into one another without

◇ a
any

trace of a boundary, then will won't it not

become
be

isn't it then a hopeless task, to draw a sharp picture corresponding to the

blurred
indistinct

one? Won't you then have to say, : “Here I might just as well draw a circle as a rectangle, or a heart shape; all the colours run into one another just anyhow.; [E|e]verything, and's correct, and nothing[,|'s] – is correct.” – And this is the position in wh[c|i]ch anyone you finds himself, for instance, yourself, if, e.g., who searches for definitions in in aesthetics or in ethics which correspond to our concepts.
Always ask yourself, in this difficulty: “How did we learn the meaning◇ of this word – ‘g[ut|ood]’, for instance? By what examples; in which language games? ◇ You will then see m[r|o]re easily that the word must have a family of mean[k|i]ngs.

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.