“But surely you won't deny that a particular command in (a) says the same as one in (b). And what

would you
are you going to

call the second, then, if not an analys[ed|is] from of the first?” – Certainly, I should also say that a command in (a) has the same meaning as a command in (b); or, as I expressed it

before
earlier

, they accomplish the same. And that means: [I|i]f someone ˇI were to show[s|n] me a command in (a) and ask[s|ed], “Which command in (b) has the same meaning as this?”, or, again,ch say: , “Which command in (b) does

it
this one

contradict has the opposite meaning?”, then I

would
should

answer the question in s[y|u]ch and such a way. should give such & such an answer. But this is does not to say mean that we have

an agreement
come to an understanding

about the use of the expression “hav[e|ing] the same meaning” or “accomplishing the same” in general.

// But this is not to say that we now have agreed as to the use of, in general, of the expressions …
// … that we have come to a general understanding about the use of the expression … //

For one

may
might

ask: In what case do we say, “th[o|e]se are only two different f[ro|or]ms of the same game”?

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.