66
“I want to call
only that a
‘name’ which cannot stand in the connection
‘X exists’
”. –
And
we ˇthus you
can
no't
say ‘red exists’, because if there were no red you
could not speak about it.”
More correctl
[t|y]: If “X
exists”
amounts to
is
say
ing,
“
‘X
’”
has meaning
”, then it is not a sentence about
“X” X but a sentence
about our
use of [p|l]anguage usage
of words,
namely viz,
the use of the word “X”.
It seems to us as though
we were saying ,
said something about the nature of red in,
saying that the words “red exists” ˇdo not make
no sense.
It exists
just ˇ– as it were
– [“|‘]in
itself
[”|’].
The same idea
, – that this is a
metaphysical statement about red
, – is
expressed
also when we say that red is timeless
,
and perhaps still more strongly in the word
“indestructible”.
But
, as a matter of
fact,
actually |
we
want only to
take
regard “red exists”
only as
statement:
[T|t]he
word “red” has meaning.
Or perha
ps more correctly: “Red does not
exist” as “‘Red’ has no
meaning”.
Only we do
_
n
[o|']t want to say that
th
[is|e] expression
says
th
[at|is], but that
ˇthis is what it would have to say
that if it
ha
[s|d] a
meaning
[.|;]
[B|b]ut that in trying to say
th
[at|is]
it contradicts itself – since red exists
[“|‘]in
itself
[”|’].
–
Whereas a
43
a contradiction
could
only be said to lie
s , if
anywhere, might be said to lie in the fact that the sentence
looks as though it were speaking
the
colour
,
whe
[r|n]eas whileˇ really , in fact, it is
supposed to say
something about the use of the word “red”.
–
In
reality ˇIn As a matter
of fact, however, we
say
that such & such a
a
particular |
colour
exists;
// In reality, however, it is quite a
natural thing to say that a particular colour
exists; // and this
means
simply
that ˇthere is something
exists that has this
colour.
And the first expression is
no
t less exact
than the second; especially not
in the case where
[“|‘]that which has the
colour
[”|’] is not a physical object.