“What the names of

a
the

language stand for must be indestructible, for we must be able to describe the

state of affairs
condition

when
in which

everything

that can be destroyed at all
destroyable

has been destroyed. And in this description there willˇ, of course, be words[;| ,] and what corresponds to them

mustn't
can't

then be ˇhave been destroyed,

or
since otherwise

the wor[s|d]s would have no meaning.” – I must_ n[o|']t saw off the branch on which I'm sitting[.|on].
Now one might indeed object, (at once), that the description itse itself must ˇat any rate make an exception for itself escape destruction. – But what ˇthat which corresp[i|o]nds to the words of the description and so ˇtherefore must not be destroyed if it ˇthe description is true, is [w|t]hat ˇwhich gives the words their meaning, without which they would have no meaning. – But this

person
man

is surely, in one sense, that which corresponds to his name. But he

is destructible,
can be destroyed;

and his name does not lose its meaning when

it's
the

bearer is destroyed. –

That which
What

corresponds to the name, and is that without which it would have no meaning, is

, e.g.,
– for instance –

a paradigm

which
that

is used in the language game in

conjunction
connection

with the name. // That which corresponds to the name and without which it would have no meaning is … //

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.