“What the names of the || a language stand for must be indestructible, for we must be able to describe the condition || state of affairs in which || when everything destroyable || that can be destroyed at all has been destroyed. And in this description there will, of course, be words; || , and what corresponds to them can't || mustn't then be || have been destroyed, since otherwise || or the words would have no meaning.” – I must not || mustn't saw off the branch on which I'm sitting. || I'm sitting on.
     Now one might indeed object, (at once), that the description itself must escape destruction || must at any rate make an exception for itself. – But what || that which corresponds to the words of the description and so || therefore must not be destroyed if it || the description is true, is what || that which gives the words their meaning, without which they would have no meaning. – But this man || personis surely in one sense || , in one sense, is surely that which corresponds to his name. But he can be destroyed; || is destructible, and his name does not lose its meaning when the || its bearer is destroyed. – What || That which corresponds to the name, and is that without which it would have no meaning, is– for instance – || , e.g., a paradigm that || which is used in the language game in connection || conjunction with the name. || That which corresponds to the name and without which it would have no meaning is – for instance – a paradigm that is used in the language game in connection with the name.