This is connected with the view || idea of naming as, so to speak, an occult process || an occult process, as it were. Naming || The naming appears as || like || seems || seems to us like || seems to us to be a strange connection of a word with the || between a word and an object. –

Ts-226,27

¤ And this || a strange connection does really take place || really is made, || – namely when the philosopher, in order to bring out || see what the connection is between a name and the || a thing named, stares at an object before himand at the same time repeats || , at the same time repeating || , repeating a name – or it may be the word “this” – over and over again. For the philosophical problems arise when language idles. And then we may imagine well enough || even imagine || indeed it's easy to imagine that naming is some remarkable || queer mental act, as it were a kind of christening || a kind of christening, as it were, of the object. And similarly we may || we may then also say the word “this” as it were to the object || to the object, as it were, address || addressing it, || – a strange use of this word, that || which probably occurs only when we are doing || engaged in philosophy || which is made only when we are philosophising || which, I think, is never made outside philosophy. –

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.