to this thing”, “pointing to that thing”, and on the other hand “pointing to the colour and not to the shape”, “meaning the colour”, etc., etc..
As I say ˇAs I have said, in certain cases, particularly in pointing [“|‘]to the shape[”|’], or [“|‘]to the number[”|’], there are characteristic exp[r|e]riences and ways of pointing, – “characteristic” because they frequently, (not [wa|al]ways[,|)] [re|oc]cur where shape or number is “meant”. But do you also know a characteristic experience for pointing to a figure piece in a game chessman as piece in a game a chessman? – And yet

you
one

may say, : “I mean this

chessman
piece in the game

is called ‘king’, not this particular

block
piece

[f|o]f wood that I'm pointing to.”
And we do here, what we do in

a host of
1000

similar cases:

as
Because

aren't able to
can't

mention ˇpoint out some one bodily action

which
that

we call “pointing to the shape” (as opposed, e.g., to the colour) we say ˇthat a mental activity corresponds to these words.
Where our language leads us to expect a body ˇlook for a physical thing, and there isn't any

thing
body

; there
, there,

we are inclined to say, is a mind. put a spirit.

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.