There are

indeed
certainly

what one can we may ˇmight be called “characteristic experiences” ofor pointing ˇ(e.g.) to the a shape , e.g. (for instance). For example instance, [t|T]racing the contour outline with one's fingerˇ, for instance, or with one's

eyes
gaze

, in pointing. – But just as little as just as thisch ˇdoesn't happens in all cases in which I [“|‘]mean the shape[”|’], – equally – similarly little is it true that there isn't any no other characteristic process ˇeither occur[[s|ing]|s] in all these cases. But

even
also,

if something of the sort such process did [re|oc]cur in all of them, it would still de[e|p]end

upon
on

the circumstances – i.e. upon what happened befo[e|r]e and after the pointing – whether we L[sh|w]ould say, : “He pointed to the shape and n[t|o]t to the colour”.
For the

expressions
words

“pointing to the shape”, “meaning the shape” etc. are not used like these as

these others
these

are like these:– “pointing to the book”, “pointing to the letter ‘B’ and not to the letter ‘u’” etc.. – For Just think only of how differently we learn the use of the

expressions
words

: “pointing to

Ts-226,25

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.