But suppose someone sa[ys|id], : “I always do the same thing when I direct my attention to

a
the

shape: I [h|f]ollow the

outline
contour

with my

Ts-226,24

my eyes and with the feeling [ …| …]”. And suppose this person gives to someone else the ostensive

explanation
definitionch

, “Th[at|is] is called ˇa ‘circle’”, by pointing, with all these experiences, to a circular object ˇ& having all these experiences[:|.] – [c|C]an't the other person still interpret this explanation differently, even although he sees that the person giving

it
the explanation

follows the shape with his eyesand , even

if
though

he feels what the person giving the explanation feels? That

is to say
is

, this “interp[e|r]etation”

may
can also

consist in the way in use which he makes now uses makes of the word,

e.g.
for instance

what he in his point[s|i]ng to when he is ˇsuch & such an object when given the command, : “Point to a circle”. – For neither the expression, “meaning the explanation in such and such a way”, nor the expression, “interpreting the explanation in such and such a way”, indicates a

particular
definite

process which accompan[ies|ying] the giving and

receiving
hearing

of the explanation.

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.